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The United States demanded

Posted on Monday 9 November 2009 at 02:03 PM - 0 Comments - Post Comment - Link

Is Iran just pretending to negotiate a deal that would ship much of its uranium abroad for enrichment? In effect, is Tehran just yanking our chain?

That issue comes up because of the comments of Iran's deputy speaker of parliament, who on Thursday appeared to reject the uranium export plan that was reached after three days of talks between Iran and world powers in pearl jewelry Vienna.

"The United States demanded Iran ship uranium abroad, in return for getting [nuclear] fuel back," said Mohammad Reza Bahonar, the deputy parliament speaker. "But Iran does not accept this."

The answer to this is: As yet we do not know what is going on in Iran. But the Iranian government does not speak with one voice, and US officials expect that dissonant voices may be heard before Tehran makes a final decision.

"A lot of this is negotiation posturing," says Peter Crail, a research analyst at the Arms Control Association in Washington.

Tehran may be trying to frame the uranium deal as a major concession on its part in order to get the biwa pearl best possible terms.

"At this point, it would be very difficult for Iran to back away from the deal altogether," Mr. Crail says.

The important players – Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei; and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – have yet to weigh in.

State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said that the draft agreement remains "a very positive step."

But some US experts believe that Iran's delaying tactics could be having an effect on something else: Iran's recently revealed second uranium-enrichment facility, near the holy city of Qom.

While the US and its partners have focused on getting Tehran's agreement to ship much of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium to Russia, less attention has been paid to the fact that it has now been a month since Qom's existence was made public. United Nations inspectors have yet to set foot inside the plant.

"A month may not seem like akoya pearl much, but it has important implications for the [International Atomic Energy Agency's] ability to properly understand the nature of the Qom facility," write Nima Gerami and James Acton, nonproliferation analysts at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in a recent article for the journal Foreign Policy.

Right now, Iran plans to let inspectors inside on Oct. 25. Given that it takes time to analyze findings such as environmental samples taken from within the Qom facility, final results are unlikely to be available prior to the next IAEA Board of Governors meeting on Nov. 23.

"By the time they are available – probably for the first board meeting next year – the current sense of urgency will have been lost," according to Messrs. Gerami and Acton.

White House officials

Posted on Monday 9 November 2009 at 02:02 PM - 0 Comments - Post Comment - Link

Aboard a military jet - NATO allies in Afghanistan are in strategic limbo as they await a decision from the Obama administration on its strategy and the troops needed to implement it.

That may make it difficult to discuss anything of any substance at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Bratislava, Slovakia, Friday, where Topic A will be the pearl jewelry mission in Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates touches down there Thursday evening on his way home from stops in Hawaii, Tokyo, and Seoul. Mr. Gates acknowledged that NATO allies have many questions about how the US will proceed, but says there is still plenty to discuss since the future of the Afghanistan mission isn't only about what the US does or doesn't do.

"The reality is this is an alliance issue," he told reporters traveling with him. "Having a discussion of that and the fact that this is a continuing shared responsibility makes it entirely appropriate to have that conversation in Bratislava before decisions are made by the United States."

The debate over Afghanistan at the White House is chewing over the flawed election results in Afghanistan.

Earlier this week, White House officials indicated the issue of the disputed election results would have to be resolved before the US could make a decision. A runoff election is now expected Nov. 7. Gates appeared to push back, however, saying that a resolution was not necessary to make a decision about sending more US troops.

"We need to be realistic that the biwa pearl issues of corruption and governance that we are trying to work with the Afghan government on are not going to be solved simply by the outcome of a presidential election," Gates said during a stop in Tokyo Tuesday.

Gates, whose perspective figures prominently in the internal deliberations at the White House, will not say if he has reached a conclusion in his own mind about what the US strategy should be and how many troops are needed. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top commander in Afghanistan, has asked for as many as 80,000 additional troops.

That leaves a major question during the defense ministerial in Bratislava.

"European governments and parliamentarians who may be asked to vote for additional resources at some point are all waiting to see exactly what the US decides to do in the wake of the McChrystal assessment," Alexander "Sandy" Vershbow, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs at the akoya pearl Pentagon, told reporters in Washington earlier this month.

Mr. Vershbow acknowledged that some ally governments, especially those that have suffered high casualties, are hearing arguments from constituents that "the cost of this war isn't worth it." But, he said, he believes most governments are trying to confront the broader security issues that Afghanistan presents once an American decision brings more clarity to the situation.

American officials, including Gates, have at times expressed frustration with the level of commitment from some members of the allied force. But this week, Gates noted that he has seen "more energy and more commitment" by NATO and other allied governments and military since last spring.

"There seems to be a renewed commitment that we have to do this and get this done right, and I think that's good."

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conversation with Abousamra

Posted on Monday 9 November 2009 at 02:01 PM - 0 Comments - Post Comment - Link

Tarek Mehanna of Sudbury, Massachusetts, is seen in this image from a video footage taken in Boston, Massachusetts, on February 11. Mehanna was arrested at his home Wednesday morning, and US federal prosecutors have charged him with conspiracy to provide material support to terrorists.
WHDH-TV/REUTERS/Handout
How FBI traced Tarek Mehanna in his quest to become a jihadi
Informants helped the FBI track Tarek Mehanna to the Middle East in search of terrorist training, according to government documents. Agents also copied his computer hard drive.
By Mark Clayton | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

from the October 22, 2009 edition

Boston - Tarek Mehanna actively tried to become a terrorist for eight years following the 9/11 attacks, US authorities allege. Arrested by the FBI Wednesday and charged with providing "material support" to terrorists, his history and footsteps took twists that led his group of three conspirators as far afield as Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, according to a criminal complaint filed in US District Court.

What follows is a time line of pearl jewelry Mr. Mehanna's and his group's alleged actions from before the 9/11 attacks in 2001 up to 2008, according to the FBI's complaint and an affidavit supporting a search warrant:

• 2000-2001 – Tarek Mehanna, who has known "CW2" (a conspirator who in late 2006 agreed to cooperate with the FBI) for 15 to 20 years, introduces him to Ahmad Abousamra, and the three men become close friends. Common interests include talking about religion and Muslims' role in the United States and justification for certain jihadist acts.

• Pre-Sept. 11, 2001 – Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 talk about going to terrorist training camps in Pakistan, searching the Internet for logistical information for locations and travel, but no solid plans materialize.

• After Sept. 11, 2001 – Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 express support for the attacks.

• April 4, 2002 – Abousamra travels to Pakistan in search of terrorist training, but apparently doesn't find it, returning home.

• Fall 2002 – Mehanna meets Daniel Maldonado through Abousamra. At Mehanna's home, they watch jihadi videos showing pillaging of the Muslim world in Bosnia and the Palestinian territories. Later, the video shows mujahideen victories and footage of people being killed. Afterward, Mehanna, Abousamra, and Maldonado talk about the glory of dying for Allah.

• Nov. 17, 2002 – Abousamra travels again to Pakistan, where he connects with a man who helps him find a Taliban camp and another run by a Lashkar e Tayyiba group. But, as he later tells CW2, he was rejected by the former for being too inexperienced and by the latter for not being Pakistani.

• 2003 – Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 determine Pakistan is not a feasible place to get terrorist training. Frustrated, they begin exploring other options, including committing domestic terrorist acts. One topic of discussion: the feasibility of shooting a member of the executive branch of government. In another discussion, killing a second member of the executive branch is debated.

• Second half of 2003 – Inspired by the 2002 sniper attacks in Washington, D.C., Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 discuss a plan to get automatic weapons, go to a shopping mall, and randomly shoot people. Abousamra says civilians aren't innocent because they pay taxes to the government and because they are Kufar (nonbelievers).

• October 2003 – Abousamra flies to California to meet with "Individual A," who tells him whom to see and where to go to find terrorist training camps in Yemen.

• Late 2003 – Discussion of the mall attack plan continues, including types of weapons needed, number of attackers involved, and coordinating the attack across different entrances. Attacking emergency responders is debated. CW2 travels to New Hampshire to meet with Maldonado, a former gang member, who is believed to have access to automatic weapons. But Maldonado says all he can get is handguns. Lacking firepower, the plan is abandoned.

• Late 2003 – Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 begin planning a trip to Yemen to attend a jihadist training camp or training in southern Jordan. Traveling to Iraq is discussed and of particular interest because of the opportunity to fight US forces and because it is more accessible than other jihad conflicts around the world.

• February 2004 – CW2 hides video of his actions that he expects to tell family about later by e-mail. Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 debate the permissibility of suicide bombings. Abousamra agrees. CW2 does not; he and Mehanna want to biwa pearl be soldiers for jihad, not suicide bombers.

• Feb. 4, 2004 – Mehanna, Abousamra, and CW2 pull together $13,000 and travel to Yemen seeking admission to a terrorist training camp. They divide the cash three ways to avoid currency reporting requirements. They also discuss a cover story to tell authorities in case they are questioned: that they are attending religious study at Dar al Mustafa school, a Yemeni school they found online. None of the three makes contact with the school. On arrival in Yemen, checking e-mail, CW2's family tells him to return, and he does. Mehanna and Abousamra continue on.

• Feb. 4-10 2004 – Mehanna and Abousamra travel Yemen looking for the people "Individual A" told them to meet. According to a later recorded conversation between Mehanna and CW2, Mehanna explains that they met a huge man, with long hair and long beard, wearing a turban. Another man with him tells them concerning training camps that "all that stuff is gone ever since the planes hit the Twin Towers."

• Feb. 11, 2004 – Mehanna and Abousamra leave Yemen for United Arab Emirates (UAE). Abousamra goes on to Jordan and, two days later, enters Iraq, where he is thought to stay about 15 days. Mehanna returns home.

• November 2005 – Maldonado travels to Egypt.

• Summer 2006 – Mehanna visits Egypt and meets with Maldonado, who moved there.

• Aug. 10-11, 2006 – FBI agents search Mehanna's bedroom and copy the hard drive of Mehanna's laptop computer on authority of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Forensic analysis shows many gigabytes of data, including hundreds of megabytes of data with evidentiary value, including video, audio, and image files, as well as documents and stored messages. Mehanna's online identities and websites are revealed, along with a February 2006 discussion in which Mehanna and another discuss their desire to be the "media wing" for Al Qaeda in Iraq.

Agents also discover that Mehanna has translated from Arabic to English, and then published on a website, a tract entitled: "39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad." Another picture from the hard drive shows Mehanna at ground zero in New York, smiling and pointing to the sky.

• Late 2006 – CW2 agrees to cooperate with FBI.

• November 2006 – Maldonado moves from Egypt to Somalia with his wife and three children. The country is then under "sharia," or Islamic law.

• Dec. 12, 2006 – Maldonado phones Mehanna from Somalia and tells him he is participating in "culinary school" and making "peanut butter and jelly" – code words referring to jihad, Mehanna later explains to an informant who is fitted with a recording device.

• Dec. 12, 2006 – Abousamra is interviewed by the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). He says he went to Yemen in 2004 to study Arabic language and religious studies.

• Dec. 15, 2006 – CW2 records a conversation with Abousamra. By the time of their meeting, both men had been interviewed by the FBI about their 2004 trip to Yemen. They discuss what each told the FBI and what the FBI asked, including whether they knew Daniel Maldonado.

• Dec. 16, 2006 – Mehanna is interviewed by two members of the JTTF, focusing on a trip he and two others took to Yemen in 2004. Asked about one of those friends, Daniel Maldonado, he says they had known each other since 2002 or 2003, but haven't spoken for two weeks. But Maldonado had called him just four days earlier from Somalia – and FBI says recorded conversations show Mehanna knew Maldonado was not in Egypt, but in Somalia for military-type training.

• Dec. 26, 2006 – Abousamra leaves Boston's Logan Airport to fly to Syria, telling customs and border patrol officers he is going to visit his wife and will return Jan. 20, 2007. He has not returned.

• Early January 2007 – Maldonado flees Kenya in face of attacks by Ethiopian forces and is captured by Kenyan military, who turn him over to the FBI. He tells agents that he called Mehanna from Somalia and urged him to join him in fighting.

• Jan. 12, 2007 – Mehanna, in a recorded conversation with CW2, talks about being interviewed by the JTTF and about his 2004 trip to Yemen. He tells CW2 the trip failed because no one was around. Half were on hajj and half were in jail. They traveled all over the country looking for the people "Individual A" told them to meet. Mehanna tells CW2 about the large man and boy with the AK-47. He reassures CW2 that although many people know the akoya pearl real reasons for their trip to Yemen, nobody was specifically told. Mehanna says once he has finished his degree he plans to move overseas.

• Feb. 14 2007 – Reports begin appearing of Maldonado's arrest at the Somali border and a telephone conversation he had with someone in the US. CW2 sends Mehanna an e-mail saying: "You read the news?" referring to Maldonado being charged for receiving terrorist training from Al Qaeda while in Somalia.

• Feb. 25, 2007 – In a recorded phone conversation, Mehanna tells CW2 he is the person Maldonado called from Somalia and discusses who might be providing information to the FBI. They talk about Abousamra, who "fled the country" after FBI questioning. Mehanna explains that "PB&J" is code that means, generally, "I'm here fighting." He tells CW2 that lying to the FBI about the call from Maldonado is a problem for him and that he isn't sure how to handle it. Mehanna advises CW2 to leave the country – and says the only thing keeping him in the US is the need to finish his degree.

• April 19, 2007 – Maldonado pleads guilty to military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization and is sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

• April 23, 2007 – Mehanna gives a compact disc with a handwritten label on it to CW1 (another FBI cooperating witness) that contains computer video files of jihad training downloaded from the Internet.

• Sept. 7, 2007 – Mehanna sends e-mail to CW1 with caption "An interesting read" with attached blog entry purportedly by and about Maldonado's travels to Egypt and Somalia.

• May 8, 2008 – A report from the US Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs notes that "39 Ways to Serve and Participate in Jihad" in English (which FBI contends Mehanna translated) is a popular text on the Internet that describes ways to support violent Islamist ideology and aid the movement with fundraising and electronic jihad, including chat rooms, disseminating propaganda, and attacking enemy websites.

• Nov. 8, 2008 – JTTF obtains consent from a Mehanna family member to search another computer Mehanna used.

• Nov. 8, 2008 – Mehanna is arrested at Boston's Logan airport. He is later charged in a complaint with lying to members of the JTTF concerning his statements about Maldonado's phone call to him from Somalia in December 2006 and other statements. He is released on bail.

• April 4, 2009 – Mehanna is active online, sending messages with contact information for Aafia Siddiqui, a defendant detained in New York on terrorism charges.

• Oct. 14, 2009 – Mehanna posts another entry on his blog, which the FBI says is a collection of reflections on religious doctrine and English translations of various works by influential advocates of jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq.

• Oct. 20, 2009 – FBI petitions for a search warrant, noting a poem it attributes to Mehanna that is widely available on the Internet: "Make Martyrdom what you Seek."

• Oct. 21, 2009 – Mehanna is arrested and charged by the FBI with providing "material support" to terrorists.

The White House's decision

Posted on Monday 9 November 2009 at 02:00 PM - 0 Comments - Post Comment - Link

Bratislava, Slovakia - NATO defense ministers Friday gave "broad support" to the counterinsurgency strategy proposed by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the top US commander in Afghanistan, but sidestepped the difficult question of how many forces would be required to implement that plan.

The top UN special envoy for Afghanistan also backed McChrystal's strategy at the NATO meeting.

"We have come to a point where I believe McChrystal is right," said Kai Eide here Friday, adding bluntly, "If we continue the way we've done so far, both with regard to the pearl jewelry military effort, the civilian effort, and the behavior of the Afghan government, this project will not work."

Taken together, the comments suggest that American allies are leaning toward a more troop-intensive, counterinsurgency approach that opens the political door for President Obama to direct deployments of tens of thousands of additional troops.

The Obama administration is deliberating over what strategy to pursue in Afghanistan – a counterinsurgency approach that focuses on securing the country and winning over the population and that would require many more troops, or a more targeted approach that focuses on taking out Al Qaeda leaders with air strikes.

While signaling support for more troops, NATO minsters did not address the tougher issue of how many more troops to send and stopped short of making additional resource commitments themselves.

"The purpose of today's meeting was not to make any decision on figures," said NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during a press event here. "I have noted broad support of biwa pearl all ministers … but without discussing resource implications."

About 40,000 NATO and non-NATO troops are currently in Afghanistan, in addition to about 68,000 US forces.

McChrystal flew to the meeting from Afghanistan to make a 15-minute pitch to 40 NATO and non-NATO ministers. During his remarks, he discussed the number of troops he believes are needed to conduct a proper counterinsurgency, but received no feedback from any of the defense ministers, according to a senior defense official who listened in on the meeting.

McChrystal is thought to be asking for as many as 80,000 additional troops for Afghanistan, but a number of about half that seems more likely to be considered.

The White House's decision on Afghanistan may be as many as three weeks away, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who has been reticent to speak about his own thinking on the way ahead in Afghanistan.

Despite its contributions in Afghanistan, the NATO alliance has been criticized by the US over the akoya pearl years for not doing enough. For years, American officials have pressured individual countries to send more troops and other resources to Afghanistan, or to loosen caveats that restrict some militaries, like that of Germany's, from conducting certain kinds of operations.

The US decision on whether to send many more troops is critical. It could sway allied nations that struggle politically with the unpopularity of the war to send more forces or at least to provide more financial resources for the war.

Particularly noteworthy

Posted on Monday 9 November 2009 at 01:58 PM - 0 Comments - Post Comment - Link

f Sunday's horrific bomb blasts in the heart of Baghdad were meant to foment political instability ahead of national elections in January, Iraq has a recourse: Its political leaders can proceed apace toward elections – an important milestone for the country and the region.

The parliamentary elections, if fair and peaceful, will mark the first real transition from one Iraqi administration to the next. They will take the country that much further down the road toward democratic maturity in a region parched of it. They will test whether Iraq's security forces can be loyal to the state, and they will help ensure that US troops withdraw, as agreed, by the end of 2011.

Any number of internal or regional actors would like to upset this scenario, which is why it's so important that Iraq's politicians clear any obstacle to the elections.

So far, the parliament has been unable to pearl jewelry agree on rules for the balloting, which, according to the Iraqi Constitution, must take place before Jan. 30. The parliament missed an Oct. 15 deadline for a new election law. American and United Nations officials warn that if lawmakers don't pass new rules by this weekend, logistics will force the election's postponement.

Two main issues stand in the way of an election law. One is whether voting lists should be "open" and include the names of candidates and not just parties. They should, because an individual is more accountable to a voter than a faceless blob of a party.

Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has spoken in favor of the open-list system. Lawmakers who biwa pearl have been able to hide and thrive behind the blob are naturally not keen on this idea.

The other issue is far less clear-cut. It has to do with who votes in the ethnically divided city of Kirkuk. Arabs and Turkmens complain that in recent years, Kurds have flooded into the city, which the Kurds claim as traditionally theirs (before Saddam Hussein imported Arabs and drove Kurds out).

Arabs and Turkmens worry that including these new residents will tip the scales in the Kurds' favor for a much larger and tougher issue: determining the future of Kirkuk. Kurds want this oil-rich area incorporated into their autonomous region; the Arabs and Turkmens resist.

The 2010 election law can't be held hostage to a difficult dispute that could take years to resolve. Whatever is decided – sidestepping the issue entirely or finding a compromise – the solution has to be an Iraqi one, and not one that predetermines the answer to the larger question of Kirkuk's future.

The Obama administration must exert all the diplomatic persuasion it can to push Iraq's leaders toward an open-list election and to keep to the political timetable. Delay may not only throw off the time line for US troop withdrawal, it could also sour voters on the political process.

Iraqis themselves should see a akoya pearl timely and more democratic election as a forward step along a continuum that has so far brought them a new constitution, an elected full-time government, sovereignty as US troops moved to a background role – and, despite last weekend's most deadly bombing since 2007 – a comparatively low level of violence.

Particularly noteworthy is the Iraqi people's rejection of sectarian violence and sectarian strife generally. They turned against Al Qaeda, held back retaliatory impulses, and in provincial elections last year did not look favorably on parties organized on religious or sectarian lines.

Insurgents have perhaps realized that bombings intended to reignite sectarian or ethnic divisions – attacking worshipers at mosques, for instance – won't bring the desired reaction. By targeting the government sector in spectacular attacks back in August and now, they look to be aiming directly at disrupting the political process. They won't succeed – unless Iraq's political leaders allow them to.